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Capital structure around the world: 
The roles of firm- and country-specific determinants 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We analyze the importance of firm-specific and country-specific factors in the leverage choice 
of firms from 42 countries around the world. Our analysis yields two new results. First, we find 
that firm-specific determinants of leverage differ across countries, while prior studies implicitly 
assume equal impact of firm-specific factors. Second, although we concur with the conventional 
direct impact of country-specific factors on the capital structure of firms, we show that there is 
an indirect impact because country-specific factors also influence the roles of firm-specific 
determinants of leverage. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior research (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2001; Claessens, Djankov and Nenova, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004) finds that 
a firm’s capital structure is not only influenced by firm-specific factors but also by country-
specific factors. In this study, we demonstrate that country-specific factors can affect corporate 
leverage in two ways. On the one hand, these factors can influence leverage directly. For 
example, a more developed bond market facilitating issue and trading of public bonds may lead 
to the use of higher leverage in a country, while a developed stock market has the opposite 
effect. On the other hand, we show that country-specific factors can also influence corporate 
leverage indirectly through their impact on firm-specific factors’ roles. For example, although 
the developed bond market of a country stimulates the use of debt, the role of asset tangibility as 
collateral in borrowing will be rather limited for firms in the same country. In other words, 
country-characteristics may explain why in one country a firm’s tangibility affects leverage, but 
not in another country. Previous studies have not systematically investigated these indirect 
effects. 
International studies comparing differences in the capital structure between countries 
started to appear only during the last decade. An early investigation of seven advanced 
industrialized countries is performed by Rajan and Zingales (1995). They argue that although 
common firm-specific factors significantly influence the capital structure of firms across 
countries, several country-specific factors also play an important role. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) compare capital structure of firms from 19 developed countries and 11 
developing countries. They find that institutional differences between developed and developing 
countries explain a large portion of the variation in the use of long-term debt. They also observe 
that some institutional factors in developing countries influence the leverage of large and small 
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firms differently. Several recent studies on the field have indicated that even among developed 
economies like the U.S. and European countries, the financing policies and managers’ behavior 
are influenced by the institutional environment and international operations (see, for example, 
Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; and Brounen, De Jong and Koedijk, 
2006). 
The literature specifically discusses only the direct impact of country characteristics on 
leverage. In an analysis of ten developing countries, Booth et al. (2001) find that capital 
structure decisions of firms in these countries are affected by the same firm-specific factors as in 
developed countries. However, they find that there are differences in the way leverage is 
affected by country-specific factors such as GDP growth and capital market development. They 
conclude that more research needs to be done to understand the impact of institutional factors on 
firms’ capital structure choices. The importance of country-specific factors in determining cross-
country capital structure choice of firms is also acknowledged by Fan et al. (2006) who analyze 
a larger sample of 39 countries. They find a significant impact of a few additional country-
specific factors such as the degree of development in the banking sector, and equity and bond 
markets. In another study of 30 OECD countries, Song and Philippatos (2004) report that most 
cross-sectional variation in international capital structure is caused by the heterogeneity of firm-, 
industry-, and country-specific determinants. However, they do not find evidence to support the 
importance of cross-country legal institutional differences in affecting corporate leverage. 
Giannetti (2003) argues that the failure to find a significant impact of country-specific variables 
may be due to the bias induced in many studies by including only large listed companies. She 
analyzes a large sample of unlisted firms from eight European countries and finds a significant 
influence on the leverage of individual firms of a few institutional variables such as creditor 
protection, stock market development and legal enforcement. Similarly, Hall et al. (2004) 
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analyze a large sample of unlisted firms from eight European countries. They observe cross-
country variation in the determinants of capital structure and suggest that this variation could be 
due to different country-specific variables. 
A remarkable feature of existing studies on international capital structure is the implicit 
assumption that the impact of firm-specific factors on leverage is equal across countries (see for 
example Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Song and Philippatos, 
2004; and Fan et al., 2006). By reporting the estimated coefficients for firm-specific 
determinants of leverage per country, these papers, on the one hand, acknowledge that the 
impact of firm-level determinants does differ in terms of signs, magnitudes and significance 
levels. On the other hand, in the analysis of country-specific determinants of corporate leverage, 
these papers also make use of country dummies in pooled firm-year regressions, thus forcing the 
firm-specific coefficients to have the same value. With an extremely large number of firm-year 
observations, it is more likely for this procedure to produce statistically significant results for 
many country-specific variables. But, utilizing an alternative regression framework where a 
single average capital structure for each country is used as an observation, one hardly finds 
strong evidence on this issue (e.g. Booth et al., 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). 
As an additional contribution of our paper, we show the invalidity of this implicit assumption. 
Our analysis without imposing such restriction thus provides a more reliable analysis on the 
importance of country-specific variables. 
The study encompasses a large number of countries (42 in total) from every continent for 
the period 1997-2001. We construct a database of nearly 12,000 firms (about 60,000 firm-year 
observations). All types of firms – large and small – are included as long as a reasonable amount 
of data is available. We analyze the standard firm-specific determinants of leverage like firm 
size, asset tangibility, profitability, firm risk and growth opportunities. Besides, we incorporate a 
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large number of country-specific variables in our analysis, including legal enforcement, 
shareholder/creditor right protection, market/bank-based financial system, stock/bond market 
development and growth rate in a country’s gross domestic product (GDP). 
We first make a detailed comparative analysis of the impact of various firm-specific 
factors. We find across a large number of countries that the impact of some factors like 
tangibility, firm size, risk, profitability and growth opportunities is strong and consistent with 
standard capital structure theories. Our study shows that, in terms of firm-specific determinants 
of leverage, capital structure theories do explain the corporate leverage choice in a large number 
of countries. Using a model with several firm-specific explanatory variables, we find a relatively 
large explanatory power of leverage regressions in most countries. However, a few determinants 
remain insignificant, and in some countries one or two coefficients are significant with an 
unexpected sign. Performing a simple statistical test, we reject the hypothesis that firm-specific 
coefficients across countries are equal. It indicates that the often-made implicit assumption of 
equal firm-level determinants of leverage across countries does not hold. 
In the analysis of the direct impact of country-specific factors, we observe that certain 
factors like GDP growth rate, bond market development and creditor right protection 
significantly explain the variation in capital structure across countries. Moreover, we find 
considerable explanatory power of country-specific variables beyond firm-specific factors. We 
then proceed to measure the indirect impact of country-specific variables. The results 
consistently show the importance of country factors as we document significant effects of these 
via firm-specific determinants. For example, we observe that in countries with a better law 
enforcement system and a more healthy economy, firms are not only likely to take more debt, 
but the effects of some firm-level determinants of leverage such as growth opportunities, 
profitability and liquidity are also reinforced. Our findings indicate that the conventional 
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theories on capital structure, developed using listed firms in the United States as a role model, 
work well in similar economies with developed legal environment and high level of economic 
development. The indirect impact analysis also indicates that firm-specific variables are 
significantly influenced by several country-specific variables but in different ways. 
 
2. Data  
Firm-specific and country-specific determinants are the two major types of variables that 
we take into account when analyzing the impacts on firms’ leverage choice. 
The firms in our sample cover 42 countries that are equally divided between developed 
and developing countries.1 Data for leverage and firm-specific variables are collected from 
COMPUSTAT Global database. We exclude financial firms and utilities. Data on country-
specific variables are collected from a variety of sources, mainly World Development Indicators 
files and Financial Structure Database of the World Bank. Few country-specific variables are 
taken from previous studies including La Porta et al. (1998), Claessens and Klapper (2002) and 
Berkowitz et al. (2003). 
Our sample period covers the years 1997-2001. The selection of a time-period involves a 
trade-off between the number of countries that can be included in the study and the availability 
of enough firm-specific data. Whenever needed, we resort to some other sources to collect any 
missing data. It is still impossible to obtain data for each and every variable from all 42 
countries during this time period. The final sample consists of 59,225 observations on 11,845 
firms. Even though we aim to keep the number of countries high enough and also maintain a 
                                                 
1
 The choice of countries in the sample depends on the availability of firm-level financial data in Compustat Global. 
We take countries that have the highest numbers of observations in the period of study and exclude those with less 
than 10 firms per year. The categorization of a country into developing and emerging economy is based on Bekaert 
and Harvey (2003) and S&P emerging market indices. 
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reasonable number of firms, our dataset has unavoidably a limited number of firms in a few 
countries.2  
In order to calculate the leverage (LEV) ratio of a firm, we adopt the following widely-
used measure: the book value of long-term debt (item#106, Compustat Global database) over 
market value of total assets which is calculated as book value of total assets (item#89) minus 
book value of equity (item#146) plus market value of equity (item#MKVAL). We use the long-
term debt ratio following Titman and Wessels (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), 
Booth et al. (2001), and Hall et al. (2004).3 Since the short-term debt consists largely of trade 
credit which is under the influence of completely different determinants, the examination of 
total debt ratio is likely to generate unreliable results. 
The firm-specific determinants of leverage we use are also selected from prior studies 
and are defined as follows. TANG: Tangibility is defined as net fixed assets (item#76) over book 
value of total assets. RISK: Business risk is defined as the standard deviation of operating 
income (item#14) over book value of total assets during the sample period. SIZE: Firm size is 
defined as the natural logarithm of total sales (item#1). TAX: Tax rate of firms is the average tax 
rate of the year directly extracted from COMPUSTAT Global (item#TR).4 GROWTH: Growth 
opportunity is defined as the market value of total assets over book value of total assets. 
PROFIT: Profitability is defined as operating income over book value of total assets. LIQUID: 
Liquidity is defined as total current assets (item#75) divided by total current liabilities 
                                                 
2
 Excluding these countries with relatively fewer numbers of firms does not change the conclusions of our analysis. 
3
 Papers that use total debt ratios only include Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Deesomsak et al (2004). However, 
the studies that investigate both long-term and total debt ratio (e.g. Wald, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; Fan et al., 2006) 
generally find similar results for both measures. We also perform robustness checks by defining long-term debt in 
terms of book value of total assets and find almost no contradictory results. 
4
 We use effective tax rates instead of marginal tax rates, because our explanatory variable concerns levels of debt, 
whereas the simulated marginal tax rates serve to explain incremental change in debt rather than the debt level 
itself. 
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(item#104).5 Several industry dummies are included as additional control variables to check the 
robustness of our results.6  
Table 1 presents mean and median values of leverage and other firm-specific factors 
from all 42 countries during 1997-2001. For the sample of 42 countries, the mean long-term 
debt ratio is 12.9%, while the median is 11.9%. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
 
Previous studies analyze long-term leverage ratios across a limited number of countries 
for the period of 1980s and 1990s and tend to observe a lower leverage in emerging economies. 
In this study, we observe a wide-ranging pattern of leverage around the world. Many 
industrialized countries have a median leverage ratio of less than 10% (e.g. Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK). With 
respect to emerging economies, we also observe very low leverage in some economies, such as 
China, Malaysia, Poland and Turkey. However, there are some developing countries with high 
long-term debt ratio (above 15%), such as Argentina, India and Korea. 
Table 1 also presents summary statistics of firm characteristics per country. For example, 
we observe that countries with low median tax rates are Hong Kong, Taiwan and Thailand; 
those with high rates include France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and the US. 
Countries with the lowest values of asset tangibility are France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and 
                                                 
5
 Potential measurement errors in calculating firm-specific variables can be expected as we assume that the 
countries in our sample apply similar accounting standards. 
6
 The following industry groups are considered in our analysis: Agriculture, forestry, fishing and resources (SIC 
code 0100 – 1499); Construction (SIC code 1500 – 1799); Food (SIC code 2000 – 2099); Tobacco, textiles, wood 
and furniture (SIC code 2100 – 2599); Paper, printing and publishing (SIC code 2600 – 2799); Chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, and petroleum (SIC code 2800 – 2999); Rubber, leather, and stone (SIC code 3000 – 3299); 
Metal, machinery and other manufacturing (SIC code 3300 – 3599 and 3700 – 3999); Electronics (SIC code 3600 – 
3699); and Transportation, trade and services (SIC code 4000 - 5999 and 6500 – 8999). Inclusion of these industry 
dummies does not yield a materially different result. 
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US, while those with the highest values are Argentina, Chile, Croatia, Mexico and Pakistan. 
Among all firm-specific variables, the values of profitability exhibit the lowest variation. 
We make use of an array of country-specific variables in our analysis of international 
capital structure. We consider a number of variables characterizing the macro-economic, legal 
and financial development of countries. These include bond and stock market structure, capital 
formation rate and GDP growth rate. The selection of some other country-specific variables 
related to corporate governance is mainly based on La Porta et al. (1998) and Claessens et al. 
(1999)7, proxying a country’s legal enforcement, shareholder/creditor right protection and 
market/bank-based financial system. Table 2 provides details on definitions, data sources and 
statistics of all country-specific variables. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 There is a problem of multi-collinearity arising from high correlations between several 
country-specific variables.8 Therefore, we construct two new variables to use as alternatives in 
the regression analysis. These new variables are: (1) STDMKTSTOCK, describing the level of 
stock market orientation of countries, calculated as the average of normalized values of 
MKTBASE and STOCK; and (2) STDENFOR, indicating the development of countries’ legal 
enforcement system, calculated as the average of normalized values of JUDICIAL, RULE, 
LEGAL and CORRUP. The details on these variables are also presented in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
7
 These variables, associated with 1982-1995 (La Porta et al., 1998) and 1996-1999 (Claessens et al., 1999), usually 
remain relatively stable enough over different years. 
8
 The correlation between MKTBASE and STOCK is 0.40. The pair-wise correlations between JUDICIAL, RULE, 
LEGAL and CORRUP are 0.73, 0.86, 0.86, 0.96 and 0.97, respectively. 
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3. Impact of firm-specific factors 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses for the firm-specific effects. The table also includes 
the hypotheses for the equal firm-coefficient tests, which will be described in Section 3.2, and 
the hypotheses for the country-specific effects, which will be discussed in Section 4.1. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Booth et al. (2001) observe that capital structures of firms are usually explained by 
several variables arising out of static trade-off, agency and information asymmetry 
considerations. In a static trade-off framework, the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-to-
assets ratio and moving towards it. In particular, the firm’s capital structure moves towards 
targets that involve the trade-off between bankruptcy-related costs and tax advantages. With 
respect to the bankruptcy costs, we expect that these costs have a negative impact on leverage, 
and one can use the following proxy variables: asset tangibility (TANG) (higher tangibility of 
assets indicates lower risk for the lender as well as reduced direct costs of bankruptcy – see 
hypothesis F1 in Table 3), firm risk (RISK) (higher risk indicates higher volatility of earnings 
and higher probability of bankruptcy – hypothesis F2), and firm size (SIZE) (an inverse proxy 
for the probability of bankruptcy whereby larger firms are less likely to face financial distress 
and bankruptcy – hypothesis F3). In order to examine the influence of taxation on leverage, 
which is expected to be positive, Fan et al. (2006) suggest using the effective tax rate (TAX) as a 
proxy (hypothesis F4).  
Agency conflicts between stockholders and bondholders arise from asset-substitution 
and underinvestment. In order to minimize these conflicts firms with high growth opportunities 
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go for lower leverage, thus seeking equity financing for their new projects instead of debt 
financing. Growth opportunities (GROWTH) are thus expected to be negatively associated with 
firms’ leverage (hypothesis F5). Once again, tangibility can be used as a proxy for 
collateralization which is expected to be positively related to leverage.  
The asymmetric information or pecking-order view suggests that firms follow a specific 
hierarchy in financing: firms prefer internal to external financing. If external finance is required, 
a firm issues the safest security first. That is, it first issues debt, then possibly hybrid securities 
such as convertible bonds, and equity only as a last resort. For testing the firm-specific 
determinants using information asymmetry considerations, it is common to use variables like 
profitability (PROFIT) (more profitable firms will have less leverage – hypothesis F6), firm size 
(smaller firms are expected to be financed less by debt because of the relatively larger 
information asymmetry problem), and liquidity (LIQUID) (accumulated cash and other liquid 
assets serve as internal source of fund and will be used first instead of debt – hypothesis F7). 
 
3.2 Methodology 
In the analysis of firm-specific determinants of leverage we test the conventional 
theoretical framework on capital structure choice of firms. We run firm-level ordinary-least-
squares regressions with leverage as the dependent variable and country’s firm-specific factors 
as explanatory variables for each of the 42 countries in our data set as follows: 
+++++++= ijijijijijijjij PROFITGROWTHTAXSIZERISKTANGLEV 6543210 βββββββ  
 iij LIQUID εβ ++ 7         (1) 
where i denotes an individual firm and j denotes a country. This is equivalent to running a 
pooled regression of firm-specific factors, taking into account country dummies. However, our 
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method yields more meaningful results since it reports the explanatory power of regression 
separately for each country. 
Next, we conduct a few statistical tests. First, we test the null hypothesis that each firm-
specific coefficient is equal across countries. The procedure includes seven different tests to 
examine whether one or more of the seven firm-specific coefficients, namely tangibility 
(hypothesis EC1), business risk (EC2), firm size (EC3), taxation (EC4), growth opportunities 
(EC5), profitability (EC6) and liquidity (EC7), have the same value for all countries in the 
sample.9 To conduct these tests, we make use of an unrestricted regression model (where all 
coefficients are allowed to vary across countries), and seven restricted models (e.g. for 
tangibility null hypothesis, we restrict that the tangibility coefficients are the same for all 
countries, but other coefficients of business risk, firm size, etc. can vary).  
Second, using a similar approach, we test the null hypothesis that all firm-specific 
coefficients of 42 countries have the same value (hypothesis EC8). In this case, our single 
restricted model of regression imposes that all seven firm-specific coefficients can not vary at 
all. This particular test is more important because it allows one to decide whether it is acceptable 
to use a single model for firms in all countries. In other words, only if EC8 is not rejected, one 
can assume that firm-specific coefficients are the same across countries. The former tests (from 
EC1 to EC7) provide additional evidence to further confirm the rejection or acceptance of EC8, 
and in case of EC8 rejection, they help to point out which firm-specific factors may largely 
influence such a rejection. 
The tests are related to the joint test of significance of regression coefficients described 
in Verbeek (2004, p.27). The test statistic is defined as: 
                                                 
9
 These hypotheses are summarized in Table 3. 
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where N is the number of observations, J is the number of regressors omitted in the restricted 
models, K is the number of regressors remaining in the restricted models including the intercept, 
and SR and SUR denote the sum-squared-residuals of the restricted and unrestricted models, 
respectively. For each measure of leverage, using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
estimation method, we get SUR by adding all sum-squared-residuals (SSR) from all the equations 
for firm-specific determinants of leverage (as specified in Equation (1)). For SR in each test (still 
using SUR), we add the SSR from the restricted equations in the system with respective 
assumptions that the relevant coefficients are the same across countries. The values of f-statistic 
provide evidence whether to reject or not the hypotheses. 
 
3.3 Results 
We start our discussion of the results with a country-by-country analysis of firm-specific 
determinants of leverage. We run regressions to explain leverage from firm-specific factors as 
shown in Equation (1). The results are reported in Table 4.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
We find that almost all coefficients of tangibility are statistically significant and 
consistent with theoretical proposition (hypothesis F1). The cross-sectional regressions yield as 
many as 36 significant positive coefficients for tangibility. In general, firm-level data in our 
sample serve the framework put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976) on the shareholder-
bondholder conflict. If a firm has a high fraction of tangible assets, then these assets can be used 
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as collateral, mitigating the lender’s risk. Hence, a large fraction of tangible assets is expected to 
be associated with high leverage, and in case of bankruptcy, the value of tangible assets should 
be higher than that of intangibles. 
Similar to tangibility results, we find 21 positively significant coefficients for firm size. 
The finding in half of the countries in our sample is in line with the hypothesis that larger firms 
have more debt (hypothesis F3). Since these firms are usually more diversified and have more 
stable cash flows, they can afford higher levels of leverage. Firm size can also be interpreted as 
a reverse proxy for bankruptcy costs. With respect to firm risk, there are only 14 significantly 
negative regression coefficients (hypothesis F2). Mixed results on this variable are also found in 
previous studies. The use of a very long period might provide a more precise proxy for risk 
factor. 
 We observe that the impact of corporate taxation on leverage choice of firms yields 
statistically significant coefficients in ten countries. However, only two out of ten significant 
coefficients are positive (hypothesis F4). MacKie-Mason (1990) notes that the reason why most 
studies fail to find plausible or significant tax effects on financing behavior is that the 
debt/equity ratios are the cumulative result of years of separate decisions and tax shields have a 
negligible effect on the marginal tax rate for most firms. In this study using global data, this 
observation seems to have a high relevance. 
Growth opportunities yield 24 negative and significant coefficients. This negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and corporate leverage tends to support the agency 
theory (hypothesis F5). Firms with brighter growth opportunities in the future prefer to keep 
leverage low so they will not give up profitable investments because of the wealth transfer from 
shareholders to creditors.  
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As for the impact of profitability, our findings are consistent with the asymmetric 
information theory which suggests that firms first use retained earnings for new investments and 
then move to debt and equity, if necessary (hypothesis F6). The expected negative relation 
between profitability and leverage is found in 25 countries. Finally, there are limited significant 
results for liquidity although conventional theories suggest a negative relation between liquidity 
and leverage (hypothesis F7). Most of significant negative coefficients belong to advanced 
economies. Overall, the general finding from Table 4 is in favor of the view that the corporate 
sector’s conditions in more developed countries are likely to meet the hypothetical requirements 
needed for the conventional theories in capital structure. 
An important question then arises: are firm-specific determinants of leverage different 
across countries? As argued earlier, it is meaningful to conduct additional analysis on the impact 
of country-specific determinants only after answering this question. If the firm-specific 
coefficients do not differ significantly across countries, we can apply one model for all firms in 
the world, similar to prior studies (Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Song and 
Philippatos, 2004; and Fan et al, 2006). Otherwise, the procedure of pooling firms from 
different countries into one regression model wrongly forces different firm-specific coefficients 
to be equal. 
In order to test the hypotheses that each of these seven firm-specific coefficients is equal 
across countries and that all firm-specific coefficients across countries are equal, we utilize an f-
test of the set-up described earlier in the methodology section. The estimates for seven firm-
specific determinants per country are already provided in Table 4. The test results are presented 
in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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For the tests involving each firm-specific coefficient (EC1, EC2, …, EC7), we can reject 
the null hypotheses, except for RISK coefficients. For the relatively more important test (EC8), 
the calculated value of the f-statistic is 5.38. It provides a strong statistical evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis that all firm-specific coefficients are simultaneously equal for 42 countries in 
our sample.10 The result implies that it is not valid to construct a model with a single pool of all 
companies in the world and test the impact of country-specific factors assuming that cross-
country firm-specific determinants are equal. The result also suggests that the use of country 
dummies can be a potential solution in the analysis of country-specific influences on leverage, 
in which case each country should serve as a particular observation in the analysis, rather than 
using a pooled sample of all firms in all countries. 
 
4. Direct and indirect impact of country-specific factors 
4.1 Hypotheses 
Several studies document that a firm’s capital structure is also affected by country-
specific factors (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2001; Claessens, Djankov and Nenova, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004). We 
consider four groups of country variables. Creditor right protection (CREDITOR), bond market 
development (BOND) and legal enforcement (STDENFOR) tend to strengthen the role of the 
bond market in the economy; thus, we group these three country-specific variables as “bond 
market structure”. Shareholder right protection (SHAREHOLDER) and the level of stock market 
orientation (STDMKTSTOCK) together represent the importance of the stock market in a 
country, and thus we refer to this group of variables as “stock market structure”. In addition, we 
                                                 
10
 The finding that regression coefficients differ across countries may be driven by the fact that there are countries 
in our sample which have very low number of firms. Therefore, we conduct a robustness check. We take two sub-
samples of countries with more than 100 firms and countries with less than 100 firms and then perform the same f-
tests within the two sub-samples. The results also reject all hypotheses.  
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take into account the role of capital formation (CAPITAL), i.e. the level of gross domestic 
capital mobilization, which can have an impact on corporate financial decisions. Finally, we 
control for the impact of general economic conditions represented by GDP growth rate (GDP).11 
The country characteristics may influence leverage choice through two channels. The 
first channel is the “direct impact”, meaning that country-specific factors directly influence the 
debt levels of firms. We expect that corporate leverage is positively influenced by the bond 
market development, by which firms have more options of borrowings and creditors are more 
willing to provide debts (see hypothesis D1 in Table 3). Conversely, with the development of 
stock market where firms have more choices for and less costs of equity, we expect that firms 
are induced to restrict their leverage (hypothesis D2). Finally, we hypothesize that an increase in 
capital formation implies more retained earnings to be accumulated, ready for further 
investments which are not dependent on debt usage, and as a result, the use of debt is negatively 
affected (hypothesis D3). 
The second channel of country characteristics’ impact on leverage is the “indirect 
impact”, meaning that country-specific variables influence the way in which firm-specific 
factors determine firms’ capital structure. The conventional theories of capital structure provide 
us with four sets of firm-specific determinants of leverage, namely (i) bankruptcy cost variables, 
(ii) tax variable, (iii) agency cost variables, and (iv) pecking order financing variables. We 
expect different indirect-impact relations across our three key groups of country factors and four 
sets of firm factors. 
The roles of bankruptcy cost variables, namely tangibility, business risk and firm size, 
can be mitigated in a country with a more developed bond market as bankruptcy costs are better 
handled because of good protection for creditors. Thus, we expect a negative indirect impact of 
                                                 
11
 See Table 2 for the definitions and statistics of country-specific variables. 
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bond market related variables on leverage via this set of firm-specific factors (hypothesis I1). As 
for the impact of capital formation, we expect that the role of bankruptcy cost variables is 
mitigated because with more available internal funds, firms face less dependence on debt usage 
and therefore, bankruptcy costs are less of an issue (hypothesis I2). 
With respect to taxation, we do not expect any significant relationship with the country-
specific variables. In each country, the effect of taxation on leverage is the outcome of a 
complex set of tax rules, which make leverage more or less valuable. For a country’s 
domestically active firms only national rules apply, while international rules apply for importing 
and exporting firms and multinationals. Our country-level variables measure macro-economic 
effects, but cannot capture the subtleties of (inter)national tax effects. 
Considering the agency cost variables, namely growth opportunities and tangibility, we 
expect that when bond and stock markets are further developed, agency problems among 
different stakeholders can be mitigated as the laws better protect both shareholders and 
creditors. Consequently, the role of agency cost variables is reduced. We, therefore, hypothesize 
a negative relationship between bond and stock market structure variables and the impact of 
growth opportunities and tangibility on leverage (hypotheses I3 and I4).  
Finally, country variables can have an indirect impact on pecking order financing 
variables, namely profitability and liquidity. We expect that capital formation has an impact of 
strengthening the roles of pecking order financing variables (hypothesis I5). With a higher level 
of available funds from capital formation, high profitability and liquidity further reduce the use 
of debt among domestic firms. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
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We adopt the following methodology to analyze the direct impact of country-specific 
variables on leverage. In the first step, we run a simple pooled OLS regression for all firms in all 
countries, taking into account cross-country differences via country dummies12: 
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in which ijijijijijijijij LIQUIDPROFITGROWTHTAXSIZERISKTANGLEV ,,,,,,,  respectively are 
the leverage and firm-specific characteristics of firm i in country j; dj are the country dummies. 
In the second step, we explore the role of country-specific variables in explaining the estimators 
of country dummy coefficients j (which are the countries’ leverages after correcting for 
impacts of firm-specific determinants) by using the following Weighted Least Squares (WLS) 
regression: 
+++++= jjjjj KSTDMKTSTOCBONDCREDITORSTDENFOR 43210ˆ γγγγγα  
jjjj wGDPCAPITALRSHAREHOLDE ++++ 765 γγγ      (3) 
in which STDENFORj, CREDITORj, BONDj, STDMKTSTOCKj, SHAREHOLDERj, CAPITALj, 
and GDPj are country characteristics defined in Table 2. The observations for the dependent 
variable are the estimators of j in Equation (2). Equation (3) explains estimated country dummy 
coefficients against a set of country-specific variables explicitly allowing for the fact that the 
estimated coefficients of firm-specific determinants are different across countries. The weights 
used in Equation (3) are inverse standard errors of the corresponding country dummies. These 
weights allow us to take into account the statistical significance of related variables.13 
                                                 
12
 By construction, this regression yields the same coefficients as provided by Equation (1) in which the estimates 
of country dummies are equal to the intercepts. 
13
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this methodology. 
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Having established the direct impact of country-specific variables on corporate leverage, 
we proceed to examine the indirect impact of country-specific variables by estimating the effect 
on firm-specific determinants. In order to do this, we first estimate the regression coefficients of 
all firm-specific variables TANG, RISK, SIZE, TAX, GROWTH, PROFIT, and LIQUID 
( jjjjjj 654321 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ ββββββ , and j7ˆβ , respectively) from Equation (1) for each country. We then 
regress the values of coefficients on the country-specific variables, again using the WLS 
estimation as mentioned earlier. The regression specification is written as follows:  
+++++= jjjjkj KSTDMKTSTOCBONDCREDITORSTDENFOR 43210ˆ λλλλλβ  
kjjj eGDPCAPITALRSHAREHOLDE ++++ 765 λλλ
 
        (4) 
in which k denotes the coefficients of firm-specific factors estimated in Equation (1) and j 
denotes a country. We also test various reduced forms of this equation.14 
 
4.3 Results:  direct impact of country-specific factors 
The results examining the direct impact of country-specific variables on leverage are 
presented in Table 6. The estimated regression coefficients of explanatory variables are shown 
in different columns. We observe that notwithstanding the limited number of countries in the 
sample, the adjusted-R2 of all regressions is above 50%. It indicates that the model specification 
we use captures a good part of the variations in country dummy coefficients. Country-specific 
determinants, therefore, should not be neglected in capital structure studies since they have a 
sizeable explanatory power. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
                                                 
14
 The analyses of both direct and indirect impacts of country-specific variables are the second stages of a two-stage 
procedure. As we estimate the regressions in independent runs, we implicitly assume that the residuals of the 
regressions in the first stage are not correlated with the country-specific variables. 
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The regression results show that corporate leverage is directly related to a number of 
country-specific factors. Factors like creditor right protection, bond market development and 
GDP growth rate consistently show statistically significant impact on capital structure. We find 
that the level of bond market development has a positive impact on capital structure, which is 
consistent with hypothesis D1. When a country’s bond market is further developed, firms have 
more choice for borrowing and are willing to take in more debt. Next, creditor right protection 
has a significantly negative impact on the leverage level of corporate sector, which does not 
support hypothesis D1. A possible explanation for this effect is that higher creditor right 
protection implies that debt is more risky for firms in general since firms are likely to be forced 
into bankruptcy in times of financial distress. Firms, therefore, are more reluctant to borrow as 
they become concerned with relatively stringent debt contracts that the creditors may impose on 
them.  
We do not find any significant support for hypotheses D2 and D3. Finally, as we control 
for the general economic conditions of the countries, GDP growth rate variable yields a positive 
impact and the coefficients are significant at 1% level across all model specifications. The 
finding indicates that in countries with relatively higher rate of economic growth, firms are more 
willing to use higher levels of debt to finance new investments.  
 
4.4 Results: indirect impact of country-specific factors 
The novel argument in this study is that country-characteristics have the potential to 
influence the importance of firm-specific determinants of corporate leverage. Therefore, we now 
examine to what extent institutional differences across countries affect the impact of firm-
specific factors. As discussed earlier, the estimated coefficient of each of the firm-specific 
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determinants for each country (Equation 1) is used as the dependent variable. The results on the 
indirect impact of country factors (Equation 4) are presented in Table 7. The regression 
coefficients of country-specific factors used as explanatory variables are presented in various 
columns. As robustness checks, we also run many other regressions with different combinations 
of explanatory variables; none of the results are found to be conflicting (therefore not reported 
here).15 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The overall results support the claim that country-specific factors also have an impact on 
the roles of firm-specific determinants of capital structure. We find a significantly negative 
effect of the variable representing market/bank-based financial system and stock market 
development (STDMKTSTOCK) on the estimated coefficient of asset tangibility, supporting a 
part of hypothesis I4. A developed stock market, for example, tends to mitigate the use of debt 
as it instead promotes the use of equity. As a result, the role of tangibility as collateral in 
borrowing is limited. We also find a strong evidence for hypothesis I5 as all the coefficients of 
CAPITAL are significantly negative for the case of profitability and liquidity. The negative 
impact of these two firm-specific variables on leverage is further strengthened when more 
domestic capital funds are accumulated. 
We also observe that a country’ legal system of enforcement indirectly influences capital 
structure in several ways. Firstly, a negative impact on firm size coefficients indicates that firm 
size is relatively less important for leverage choice of firms. As firm size is a reverse proxy of 
bankruptcy cost/risk, better law enforcement is likely to force borrowers to abide by their debt 
                                                 
15
 We do not report the regressions for TAX because no specification yields a statistically significant coefficient. 
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contracts. The result is consistent with our hypothesis I1. On the other hand, in countries with 
lower enforcement, the role of firm size as a proxy for information asymmetry alleviation is 
further enhanced. Secondly, firms operating in an environment with effective enforcement have 
to consider more carefully about their leverage choice because bankruptcy risk becomes more 
important. Higher law enforcement also makes the impact of profitability more important. 
According to the free cash flow theory, debt is used as a bonding or disciplinary device to 
ensure that the management pays out profits, rather than engages in empire-building activities 
(Jensen, 1986). Better law enforcement, including reduced level of corruption, further 
strengthens the role of profitability in making debt more aligned with its disciplinary role. 
Although we do not find any evidence for hypotheses I2 and I3, we do observe several 
significant relationships which are not hypothesized but can be explained. Shareholder right 
protection has a significant positive effect on firm size coefficient and a significant negative 
effect on profitability coefficient. Firm size can be a proxy for information asymmetry: larger 
firms are expected to have less information asymmetry. When shareholders are better protected, 
firms are more likely to be operated in alignment with shareholders’ interest, thereby 
strengthening the influence of firm size. On the other hand, shareholder right protection 
strengthens the negative impact of profitability on leverage, as firms have to care more about 
their performance to fit with shareholders’ interests. The control variable, GDP, shows up with a 
significantly strengthening impact on the role of growth opportunities. 
Taken as a whole, the results presented in Tables 6 and 7 suggest significant roles of 
various country-specific factors, not only directly determining corporate leverage, but also 
affecting the way firm-specific factors influence firms’ choice of capital structure. We find that 
legal enforcement-related factors and variables characterizing the economic development of 
countries tend to show the greatest impacts, both directly and indirectly. 
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5. Conclusions 
Capital structure theories have been mostly developed and tested in the single-country 
context. Researchers have identified several firm-specific determinants of a firm’s leverage, 
based on the three most accepted theoretical models of capital structure, i.e. the static trade-off 
theory, the agency theory and the pecking-order theory. A large number of studies have been 
conducted to date investigating to what extent these factors influence capital structures of firms 
operating within a specific country. In this paper, we examine the role of firm-specific 
determinants of corporate leverage choice around the world. We analyze a large sample of 42 
countries, divided equally between developed and developing countries. Our main objective is 
to verify the role of various country-specific factors in determining corporate capital structure. 
We distinguish two types of effects: the direct effect on leverage and the indirect effect through 
the influence on firm-specific determinants of corporate leverage. 
We find that the impact of several firm-specific factors like tangibility, firm size, risk, 
growth and profitability on cross-country capital structure is significant and consistent with the 
prediction of conventional capital structure theories. On the other hand, we also observe that in 
each country one or more firm-specific factors are not significantly related to leverage. For 
some countries, we find results that are inconsistent with theoretical predictions. 
Several studies analyzing international capital structure assume cross-country equality of 
firm-level determinants. We show that this assumption is unfounded. Rather, it is necessary to 
conduct an analysis of country-specific factors by including countries as observations and avoid 
a specification using a pooled regression method. We conduct regressions using country-specific 
factors to explain coefficients of country dummies as well as firm-specific determinants. 
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Analyzing the direct impact of country-specific factors on leverage, the evidence 
suggests that creditor right protection, bond market development, and GDP growth rate have a 
significant influence on corporate capital structure. In measuring the impact indirectly, we find 
evidence for the importance of legal enforcement, creditor/shareholder right protection, and 
macro-economic measures such as capital formation and GDP growth rate. It implies that in 
countries with a better legal environment and more stable and healthier economic conditions, 
firms are not only likely to take more debt, but the effects of firm-level determinants of leverage 
are also reinforced. Overall, the evidence provided here highlights the importance of country-
specific factors in corporate capital structure decisions. Our conclusion is that country-specific 
factors do matter in determining and affecting the leverage choice around the world, and it is 
useful to take into account these factors in the analysis of a country’s capital structure. If the 
limitations of data, especially the number of countries, can be overcome, one might find even 
more significant results with respect to the impact of country-specific factors. 
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Table 1: Cross-country statistics of leverage and other firm-specific variables 
 
This table presents mean (median in parentheses) values of leverage and other firm-specific characteristics from 42 countries. All variables are averaged over the period 
1997-2001, in which data are required to be available for at least three years. The firm-specific variables are as follows. LEV: Leverage defined as book value of long-term 
debt (item#106 in Compustat Global database) over market value of total assets, calculated as book value of total assets (item#89) minus book value of equity (item#146) 
plus market value of equity (item#MKVAL). TANG: Tangibility defined as net fixed assets (item#76) over book value of total assets. RISK: Risk defined as the standard 
deviation of operating income (item#14) over book value of total assets during the sample period. SIZE: Firm size defined as the natural logarithm of total sales (item#1). 
TAX: Tax rate of firms is the average tax rate (item#TR) of the year. GROWTH: Growth opportunity defined as the market value of total assets over book value of total 
assets. PROFIT: Profitability defined as operating income over book value of total assets. LIQUID: Liquidity defined as total current assets (item#75) divided by total 
current liabilities (item#104). Obs. is the number of firms per country. 
 
Country LEV TANG RISK SIZE TAX GROWTH PROFIT LIQUID Obs. 
Argentina 0.229 0.600 0.030 5.99 15.96 2.308 0.105 1.749 23 
 (0.236) (0.567) (0.030) (6.11) (15.61) (0.900) (0.095) (0.905)  
Australia 0.116 0.338 0.113 4.85 21.99 1.936 0.035 2.718 254 
 (0.081) (0.296) (0.063) (5.05) (27.37) (1.362) (0.069) (1.463)  
Austria 0.103 0.327 0.037 5.04 17.78 1.418 0.076 3.198 60 
 (0.081) (0.361) (0.023) (5.14) (23.02) (1.133) (0.086) (1.556)  
Belgium 0.112 0.291 0.039 5.32 31.80 1.908 0.119 1.688 82 
 (0.088) (0.278) (0.023) (5.17) (27.06) (1.344) (0.121) (1.363)  
Brazil 0.162 0.485 0.044 6.84 22.07 0.951 0.118 1.297 101 
 (0.136) (0.517) (0.039) (6.72) (24.34) (0.856) (0.121) (1.179)  
Canada 0.150 0.447 0.082 5.32 23.41 2.029 0.071 3.036 413 
 (0.128) (0.425) (0.048) (5.57) (28.02) (1.419) (0.114) (1.792)  
Chile 0.187 0.572 0.034 4.31 10.50 1.032 0.107 2.500 81 
 (0.134) (0.598) (0.025) (4.35) (11.70) (0.954) (0.101) (1.543)  
China 0.17 0.435 0.038 7.26 11.83 1.019 0.071 1.848 108 
 (0.047) (0.370) (0.028) (7.28) (13.74) (0.823) (0.066) (1.408)  
Colombia 0.112 0.501 0.025 5.79 14.96 0.764 0.062 1.635 14 
 (0.089) (0.500) (0.022) (5.66) (17.24) (0.794) (0.083) (1.551)  
Croatia 0.128 0.617 0.022 2.37 29.88 1.001 0.133 1.703 13 
 (0.086) (0.632) (0.014) (2.08) (30.32) (0.914) (0.113) (1.166)  
Denmark 0.134 0.356 0.055 6.87 27.48 1.685 0.098 2.061 99 
 (0.104) (0.336) (0.030) (6.81) (28.87) (1.107) (0.113) (1.586)  
Finland 0.121 0.315 0.061 5.08 30.95 2.271 0.132 2.147 97 
 (0.107) (0.272) (0.040) (4.70) (29.20) (1.372) (0.135) (1.739)  
France 0.097 0.184 0.053 4.92 26.07 2.034 0.111 1.880 504 
 (0.073) (0.143) (0.031) (4.58) (33.68) (1.382) (0.110) (1.492)  
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Table 1 (continued): Cross-country statistics of leverage and other firm-specific variables 
 
Country LEV TANG RISK SIZE TAX GROWTH PROFIT LIQUID Obs. 
Germany 0.072 0.226 0.082 4.82 31.03 3.122 0.080 3.625 575 
 (0.040) (0.194) (0.054) (4.62) (34.24) (1.401) (0.108) (2.218)  
Greece 0.055 0.338 0.039 5.04 24.43 2.431 0.132 1.845 64 
 (0.029) (0.310) (0.033) (4.99) (25.75) (2.202) (0.118) (1.652)  
Hong Kong 0.099 0.324 0.086 6.99 11.32 1.176 0.009 2.561 110 
 (0.056) (0.298) (0.043) (7.00) (9.10) (0.907) (0.033) (1.620)  
Hungary 0.094 0.535 0.035 3.64 10.61 1.714 0.154 2.454 15 
 (0.079) (0.520) (0.027) (3.95) (12.61) (1.464) (0.145) (2.062)  
India 0.222 0.414 0.046 1.96 14.84 1.993 0.145 1.894 226 
 (0.183) (0.406) (0.035) (1.91) (13.85) (1.099) (0.141) (1.634)  
Indonesia 0.189 0.427 0.059 6.06 197.34 1.272 0.122 2.377 177 
 (0.148) (0.423) (0.049) (6.01) (16.98) (1.095) (0.112) (1.319)  
Ireland 0.144 0.426 0.081 4.94 17.86 2.093 0.069 1.784 37 
 (0.115) (0.422) (0.028) (5.39) (17.13) (1.428) (0.116) (1.520)  
Italy 0.080 0.246 0.041 5.37 32.99 1.762 0.087 1.931 164 
 (0.054) (0.201) (0.024) (5.24) (39.27) (1.341) (0.096) (1.566)  
Japan 0.108 0.314 0.021 3.59 38.83 1.307 0.072 1.787 2920 
 (0.084) (0.300) (0.014) (3.45) (45.35) (0.981) (0.066) (1.353)  
Korea 0.164 0.400 0.044 6.58 32.23 1.144 0.102 1.915 144 
 (0.173) (0.434) (0.031) (6.59) (24.96) (0.912) (0.091) (1.048)  
Malaysia 0.087 0.408 0.062 5.14 15.38 1.274 0.068 2.049 498 
 (0.045) (0.399) (0.041) (4.93) (16.22) (1.071) (0.076) (1.457)  
Mexico 0.181 0.503 0.037 1.95 32.15 1.226 0.134 1.977 54 
 (0.142) (0.566) (0.025) (2.09) (25.09) (1.105) (0.128) (1.447)  
Netherlands 0.091 0.265 0.072 5.78 24.31 2.388 0.101 2.584 136 
 (0.073) (0.254) (0.036) (5.77) (29.01) (1.459) (0.135) (1.459)  
New Zealand 0.169 0.546 0.064 5.36 24.94 1.554 0.129 1.681 47 
 (0.150) (0.511) (0.034) (5.50) (32.14) (1.225) (0.137) (1.511)  
Norway 0.198 0.315 0.089 6.37 23.92 2.049 0.068 4.558 97 
 (0.142) (0.243) (0.050) (6.14) (24.46) (1.255) (0.089) (1.761)  
Pakistan 0.166 0.506 0.053 1.48 18.26 1.117 0.153 1.245 45 
 (0.123) (0.598) (0.042) (1.19) (17.80) (0.995) (0.141) (1.065)  
Peru 0.117 0.498 0.037 5.74 21.98 0.916 0.137 1.820 19 
 (0.092) (0.492) (0.028) (5.87) (27.69) (0.850) (0.121) (1.445)  
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Table 1 (continued): Cross-country statistics of leverage and other firm-specific variables 
 
Country LEV TANG RISK SIZE TAX GROWTH PROFIT LIQUID Obs. 
Philippines 0.136 0.476 0.088 0.25 21.14 6.551 0.086 5.491 77 
 (0.074) (0.466) (0.041) (0.40) (12.73) (0.886) (0.065) (1.249)  
Poland 0.052 0.403 0.054 6.53 31.84 1.401 0.124 2.075 23 
 (0.037) (0.458) (0.043) (6.36) (30.58) (1.139) (0.120) (1.592)  
Portugal 0.135 0.407 0.030 5.82 29.69 1.565 0.100 1.079 31 
 (0.116) (0.417) (0.026) (6.03) (26.69) (1.167) (0.093) (1.085)  
Singapore 0.093 0.354 0.060 4.56 19.04 1.326 0.074 1.897 310 
 (0.056) (0.346) (0.042) (4.46) (20.48) (1.115) (0.073) (1.536)  
Spain 0.103 0.383 0.028 5.99 22.87 1.809 0.120 1.423 93 
 (0.078) (0.379) (0.022) (5.92) (25.39) (1.362) (0.111) (1.223)  
Sweden 0.103 0.216 0.101 6.30 21.57 2.244 0.017 3.081 206 
 (0.057) (0.163) (0.057) (6.49) (24.17) (1.608) (0.091) (2.180)  
Switzerland 0.148 0.367 0.050 5.98 20.30 1.875 0.096 2.290 164 
 (0.114) (0.340) (0.024) (5.90) (22.14) (1.275) (0.114) (1.821)  
Taiwan 0.113 0.370 0.029 2.39 6.70 1.605 0.076 1.690 153 
 (0.092) (0.370) (0.022) (2.41) (8.05) (1.330) (0.065) (1.461)  
Thailand 0.174 0.452 0.053 7.52 10.41 0.994 0.094 1.665 244 
 (0.126) (0.431) (0.043) (7.43) (5.31) (0.938) (0.090) (1.49)  
Turkey 0.059 0.324 0.081 4.55 30.05 2.648 0.221 1.799 39 
 (0.031) (0.313) (0.061) (4.57) (27.03) (1.967) (0.232) (1.579)  
UK 0.084 0.333 0.082 4.71 21.20 2.212 0.092 2.259 795 
 (0.056) (0.280) (0.048) (4.64) (25.52) (1.564) (0.119) (1.426)  
US 0.144 0.295 0.084 5.86 24.90 2.667 0.074 2.982 2537 
 (0.093) (0.232) (0.046) (5.94) (32.42) (1.760) (0.116) (2.061)  
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Table 2: Description and summary statistics of country-specific variables 
 
This table presents country-specific variable names, abbreviations, definitions, sources of data, numbers of observations, and means/medians of the available data. Obs. is 
the number of countries with available data and information. 
 
Statistics Name (abbreviation) Description 
Mean Median Obs. 
Efficiency of judicial 
     system (JUDICIAL) 
The assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
     particularly foreign firms”, as defined by La Porta et al. (1998), averaged through 1980-1983. 7.836 8.375 38 
Rule of law (RULE) The assessment of the law and order tradition in the country, defined by La Porta et al. (1998), 
     averaged through 1982-1995. 7.584 8.545 40 
Legality (LEGAL) The index derived from a principal component analysis of the five observed legality variables, defined 
     by Berkowitz et al. (2003), period: 1980-1995. 17.074 18.270 38 
Corruption (CORRUP) International Country Risk assessment of the corruption in governments as defined by La Porta et al. 
     (1998), average through 1982-1995. 7.321 7.800 38 
Standardized enforcement  
     (STDENFOR) 
The average of standardized values of JUDICIAL, RULE, LEGAL, and CORRUP. In case of missing 
      values, we take the average of available data. 0.000 0.077 40 
Creditor right protection  
     (CREDITOR) 
Creditor right protection, an index aggregating different creditor rights as defined by La Porta et al.,  
     1998. (Source: La Porta et al. 1998, and Claessens and Klapper, 2002). 2.050 2.000 40 
Bond market development  
     (BOND) 
The development of bond market defined as the total (private plus public) bond market capitalization  
     over GDP, average through 1997-2001 (source: World Bank, Financial Structure Database). Data  
     for Indonesia are averaged through 1990-1994 (source: World Bank, The emerging Asian bond  
     market, June 1995). 
0.577 0.496 40 
 
Market/Bank-based 
      financial system  
     (MKTBASE) 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the country’s financial system is market-based and 0 if it is bank- 
     based. (Sources: Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001; for China, Taiwan and Croatia: the National  
     Bank and Statistics Office of the corresponding country). 
0.568 1.000 42 
Stock market development  
     (STOCK) 
The development of stock market in a country is defined as the stock market capitalization over the  
     country’s GDP, average through 1997-2001. (Source: World Development Indicators and Financial  
     Structure Database). 
0.640 0.440 42 
Standardized stock market  
     (STDMKTSTOCK) 
The average of standardized MKTBASE and standardized STOCK 0.000 0.017 42 
Shareholder right  
     protection  
     (SHAREHOLDER) 
Shareholder right protection, an index aggregating different shareholder rights as defined by La Porta 
     et al. (1998). (Source: La Porta et al. 1998). 3.132 3.000 38 
Capital formation  
     (CAPITAL) 
Defined as the average of annual gross capital formation (as a proportion of GDP) in each country,  
     averaged through 1997-2001. (Source: World Development Indicators). 0.228 0.222 42 
GDP growth (GDP) Defined as the average of annual real GDP growth rate (unit: %) of each country, averaged through  
     1997-2001. (Source: World Development Indicators). 3.122 2.972 42 
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Table 3: Hypotheses 
The table summarizes the hypotheses for the firm- and country-specific effects, and the hypotheses for equal firm-specific coefficient tests.  
 
Firm-specific effects 
Hypothesis F1:   Tangibility has a positive effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F2:   Business risk has a negative effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F3:   Firm size has a positive effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F4:   Tax has a positive effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F5:   Growth opportunities have a negative effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F6:   Profitability has a negative effect on leverage 
Hypothesis F7:   Liquidity has a negative effect on leverage 
 
Equal firm-specific coefficients 
Hypothesis EC1:  Tangibility coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC2:  Risk coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC3:  Size coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC4:  Tax coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC5:  Growth opportunity coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC6:  Profitability coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC7:  Liquidity coefficients are equal across all countries 
Hypothesis EC8:  All firm-specific variables’ coefficients are simultaneously equal across all countries 
 
Direct country-specific effects 
Hypothesis D1:  Bond market structure (i.e. standardized enforcement, creditor right protection and bond market development) has a positive effect on leverage 
Hypothesis D2:   Stock market structure (i.e. standardized stock market and shareholder right protection) has a negative effect on leverage 
Hypothesis D3:   Capital formation has a negative effect on leverage 
 
Indirect country-specific effects 
Hypothesis I1:  Bond market structure mitigates the effect of bankruptcy costs (tangibility, risk and size) on leverage 
Hypothesis I2:  Capital formation mitigates the effect of bankruptcy costs (tangibility, risk and size) on leverage 
Hypothesis I3:  Bond market structure mitigates the effect of agency costs (growth opportunities and tangibility) on leverage 
Hypothesis I4:  Stock market structure mitigates the effect of agency costs (growth opportunities and tangibility) on leverage 
Hypothesis I5:  Capital formation strengthens the effect of pecking order financing (profitability and liquidity) on leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
Table 4: Impact of firm-specific variables on leverage across countries 
 
This table presents regression results of leverage on firm-specific variables for 42 countries using annual average data of 1997 - 2001 estimated from Equation (1): 
iijijijijijijijjij LIQUIDPROFITGROWTHTAXSIZERISKTANGLEV εββββββββ ++++++++= 76543210 where i denotes an individual firm and j denotes a 
country. All variables are defined in Table 1. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. White heteroskedasticity adjustment is used. Obs. is the number of firms per country in the regressions. Adj-R2 is the value of adjusted-R2 for the regression. 
 
Country Intercept TANG RISK SIZE TAX GROWTH PROFIT LIQUID Obs. Adj-R2 
Argentina -0.151 0.620 a 1.976 0.012 -0.003b 0.003 -0.400 -0.020c 23 0.55 
 (0.441) (0.000) (0.298) (0.698) (0.021) (0.140) (0.582) (0.078)   
Australia 0.030 0.161 a -0.161b 0.016 a 0.000 -0.007b -0.160 a -0.001 254 0.23 
 (0.258) (0.000)  (0.026) (0.000) (0.903) (0.034) (0.000) (0.231)   
Austria 
-0.010 0.201 b 0.464 0.011 0.000 -0.017 -0.019 0.001 60 0.23 
 (0.886) (0.011) (0.419) (0.239) (0.180) (0.192) (0.878) (0.361)   
Belgium 0.097b 0.226 a -0.086 -0.001 0.000 -0.015a -0.097 -0.007 82 0.30 
 (0.070) (0.000)  (0.408) (0.917) (0.352) (0.005) (0.176) (0.378)   
Brazil 0.192c 0.139c 0.034 -0.005 0.000 0.014 -0.423c -0.020 101 0.04 
 (0.093) (0.080) (0.942) (0.691) (0.372) (0.362) (0.069) (0.442)   
Canada 0.024 0.184 a -0.194 a 0.021 a 0.000 -0.014 a -0.259 a -0.001 413 0.36 
 (0.372) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000)  (0.745) (0.003) (0.000)  (0.132)   
Chile 0.075 0.243 a -0.851 0.034 a 0.000 -0.145 a 0.037 -0.002 81 0.37 
 (0.373) (0.010) (0.237) (0.002) (0.910) (0.000) (0.909) (0.695)   
China 
-0.321 a 0.414 a -0.289 0.041 a 0.000 -0.014 -0.421c 0.008 108 0.44 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.264) (0.000) (0.646) (0.353) (0.077) (0.178)   
Colombia 
-0.068 0.095 0.174 0.006 -0.004 0.172 -0.097 0.016 14 0.001 
 (0.882) (0.482) (0.922) (0.799) (0.319) (0.408) (0.895) (0.834)   
Croatia 0.459 -0.101 2.673 0.089 -0.011c -0.128 -0.390 -0.014 13 0.48 
 (0.230) (0.804) (0.397) (0.112) (0.070) (0.234) (0.563) (0.765)   
Denmark 0.015 0.297 a 0.004 0.008 0.000 -0.017 a -0.102 0.000 99 0.27 
 (0.823) (0.000)  (0.987) (0.269) (0.256) (0.002) (0.289) (0.996)   
Finland 0.103b 0.249 a -0.264c 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.164b -0.006 97 0.39 
 (0.060) (0.000)  (0.053) (0.536) (0.138) (0.204) (0.044) (0.429)   
France 0.065 a 0.275 a -0.034 0.004c 0.000 -0.009 a -0.075b -0.004b 503 0.32 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.596) (0.066) (0.934) (0.000)  (0.024) (0.026)   
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Table 4 (continued): Impact of firm-specific variables on leverage across countries 
 
Country Intercept TANG RISK SIZE TAX GROWTH PROFIT LIQUID Obs. Adj-R2 
Germany 0.019c 0.266 a -0.053 0.001 0.000 -0.001a 0.003 -0.001c 571 0.31 
 (0.058) (0.000)  (0.113) (0.761) (0.391) (0.000) (0.895) (0.055)   
Greece -0.040 0.249 a -0.141 0.017c -0.001 0.008 -0.409 a -0.010 64 0.47 
 (0.395) (0.000)  (0.632) (0.059) (0.236) (0.316) (0.008) (0.217)   
Hong Kong -0.017 0.110b -0.319 a 0.017 a 0.000 -0.009 -0.342 a -0.001 109 0.15 
 (0.698) (0.030) (0.001) (0.004) (0.346) (0.412) (0.001) (0.188)   
Hungary 0.165 0.252 0.155 0.015 -0.002 -0.037 -1.079 -0.005 15 0.20 
 (0.326) (0.246) (0.851) (0.444) (0.383) (0.1441) (0.165) (0.798)   
India 0.124 a 0.550 a -0.478c 0.011 -0.001c -0.005c -0.817 a 0.006 226 0.54 
 (0.004) (0.000)  (0.073) (0.157) (0.064) (0.085) (0.000)  (0.631)   
Indonesia -0.074 0.270 a -0.011 0.040 a -0.000a -0.035 c -0.409 a 0.000 177 0.22 
 (0.318) (0.000)  (0.974) (0.000) (0.001) (0.056) (0.001) (0.686)   
Ireland 0.105 0.239b -0.190 0.025a -0.001 -0.024a -0.401 a -0.046c 37 0.52 
 (0.422) (0.035) (0.135) (0.010) (0.471) (0.001) (0.000) (0.095)   
Italy -0.009 0.131 b -0.007 0.017 a 0.000 -0.011b -0.070 -0.002 164 0.28 
 (0.740) (0.011) (0.948) (0.000)  (0.657) (0.015) (0.166) (0.532)   
Japan 0.014c 0.337 a -0.127a 0.010 a 0.001 a 0.000 -0.355 a -0.007 a 2920 0.37 
 (0.052) (0.000)  (0.008) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.819) (0.000)  (0.000)    
Korea -0.007 0.209 a 0.119 0.020 a 0.0001b -0.015c -0.365 a -0.001 142 0.40 
 (0.867) (0.000)  (0.545) (0.000) (0.046) (0.069) (0.001) (0.574)   
Malaysia 0.006 0.118 a -0.163 b 0.017 a 0.000 -0.011c -0.356 a -0.005a 496 0.16 
 (0.822) (0.000)  (0.015) (0.000)  (0.675) (0.051) (0.000)  (0.004)   
Mexico 0.298 a 0.262a -0.300 -0.019 0.001 -0.110 a -0.365 -0.018 54 0.39 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.225) (0.144) (0.106) (0.003) (0.145) (0.206)   
Netherlands 0.042 0.147 a -0.303 b 0.013 a 0.000 0.001 -0.295 a -0.001b 136 0.24 
 (0.213) (0.004) (0.017) (0.000) (0.249) (0.492) (0.001) (0.044)   
New Zealand 0.117 0.101c -0.498 0.021c 0.000 -0.063b -0.071 0.021 47 0.23 
 (0.310) (0.312) (0.183) (0.077) (0.235) (0.043) (0.728) (0.221)   
Norway 0.002 0.531 a -0.209a 0.011 -0.001a -0.004 -0.170b 0.002 a 97 0.61 
 (0.980) (0.000)  (0.006) (0.244) (0.001) (0.320) (0.035) (0.009)   
Pakistan -0.099 0.513 a 0.577 0.017 0.000 0.011 -0.602 a 0.027 45 0.55 
 (0.421) (0.000)  (0.289) (0.231) (0.829) (0.694) (0.003) (0.510)   
Peru -0.025 0.160 -0.800 0.045b -0.001c -0.077a -0.611b 0.001 19 0.54 
 (0.855) (0.175) (0.207) (0.030) (0.070) (0.007) (0.039) (0.959)   
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Table 4 (continued): Impact of firm-specific variables on leverage across countries 
 
Country Intercept TANG RISK SIZE TAX GROWTH PROFIT LIQUID Obs. Adj-R2 
Philippines 0.115b 0.040 0.049 0.000 0.000 -0.001a 0.106 -0.001 77 0.03 
 (0.027) (0.666) (0.763) (0.989) (0.933) (0.000) (0.653) (0.145)   
Poland 0.063 -0.021 0.142 0.009 0.000 -0.026 0.118 -0.021c 23 0.10 
 (0.478) (0.779) (0.757) (0.514) (0.758) (0.203) (0.651) (0.095)   
Portugal 0.068 0.166b -0.974c 0.014 0.000 -0.015b -0.525 0.024 31 0.26 
 (0.618) (0.063) (0.076) (0.298) (0.273) (0.014) (0.127) (0.503)   
Singapore 0.054 0.168 a -0.122 0.013 b 0.000 -0.030 a -0.214 a -0.009c 310 0.23 
 (0.197) (0.000)  (0.153) (0.016) (0.555) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053)   
Spain 0.038 0.183 a 0.028 0.010 0.000 -0.006 -0.377b -0.001 92 0.24 
 (0.510) (0.001) (0.939) (0.135) (0.517) (0.414) (0.026) (0.963)   
Sweden 0.099 a 0.339 a -0.173a 0.000 -0.0003c -0.015 a -0.075b -0.003c 206 0.38 
 (0.005) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.955) (0.083) (0.000) (0.045) (0.077)   
Switzerland 0.152a 0.302 a -0.229c -0.009 0.000 -0.013 b -0.090 -0.006c 164 0.41 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.056) (0.172) (0.271) (0.015) (0.299) (0.076)   
Taiwan 0.053b 0.220 a -0.200 0.023 a 0.000 -0.032 a -0.248b 0.002 153 0.38 
 (0.046) (0.000)  (0.452) (0.000) (0.231) (0.001) (0.045) (0.824)   
Thailand 
-0.057 0.228 a -0.499c 0.029 a -0.002 a 0.010 -0.538 a -0.005 244 0.23 
 (0.448) (0.000)  (0.077) (0.001) (0.006) (0.526) (0.000)  (0.470)   
Turkey 0.146 0.167c 0.148 -0.016c 0.000 -0.001 -0.144 -0.024 39 0.13 
 (0.185) (0.067) (0.375) (0.357) (0.857) (0.830) (0.112) (0.262)   
UK 
-0.007 0.170 a -0.033 0.012 a 0.000 -0.004 a -0.086 a 0.000 795 0.31 
 (0.505) (0.000)  (0.227) (0.000)  (0.611) (0.006) (0.000) (0.352)   
US 0.095 a 0.239 a -0.181 a 0.008 a 0.000 -0.012 a -0.142 a -0.003 b 2533 0.30 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.204) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.043)     
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Table 5: F-test for the equality of coefficients of firm-specific determinants across countries 
 
This table presents the test results of the null hypotheses that each of the firm-specific coefficients is the same across 
countries (hypotheses EC1 to EC7), and also the null hypothesis that all firm-specific coefficients of 42 countries have the 
same value (hypothesis EC8).  The test statistic is
)/(
/)(
KNS
JSSf
UR
URR
−
−
=
 where N is the number of observations, J is the number of 
regressors omitted in the restricted models, K is the number of regressors remaining in the restricted models including the 
intercept, and SR and SUR denote the sum-squared-residuals of the restricted (equal coefficients are imposed) and unrestricted 
(coefficients may differ across countries) models, respectively. Using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation 
method, we get SUR by adding all sum-squared-residuals (SSR) from all the equations for firm-specific determinants of 
leverage (as specified in Equation (1)). For SR in each test (still using SUR), we add the SSR from the restricted equations in 
the system with respective assumption that the relevant coefficients are the same across countries. Rejection means the null 
hypothesis is rejected at 5% level. 
 
 
 TANG RISK SIZE TAX GROWTH PROFIT LIQUID ALL 
f-statistic 7.290 1.165 3.676 1.551 8.773 4.369 2.305 5.383 
p-value 0.000 0.218 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 11834 11834 11834 11834 11834 11834 11834 11834 
K 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 49 
J 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 287 
Result Rejection No rejection Rejection Rejection Rejection Rejection Rejection Rejection 
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Table 6: Direct impact of country-specific variables on leverage 
 
This table presents the WLS regression results of country dummy coefficients ( jαˆ ) against country-specific factors estimated from Equation (3): 
jjjjjjjjj wGDPCAPITALRSHAREHOLDEKSTDMKTSTOCBONDCREDITORSTDENFOR ++++++++= 76543210ˆ γγγγγγγγα  in which the country dummy 
coefficients are reported in Table 4 (intercept). All country-specific variables are defined in Table 2. The weights are inverse standard errors of the corresponding 
country dummy coefficients estimated from Equation (2). The significant coefficients are printed in bold with p-values in parentheses. The superscripts a, b, and c 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The number of observations is 37, which are the countries that have all country-
specific variables available. Adj-R2 is the value of adjusted-R2 for the regression. 
 
 
Explanatory variables Dependent 
variable Intercept STDENFOR CREDITOR BOND STDMKTSTOCK SHAREHODLER CAPITAL GDP 
Adj-R2 
COUNTRYDUM 0.0051 -0.0176 -0.0164a 0.0368 0.0036 -0.0032 0.0271 0.0200 a 0.54 
 (0.9247) (0.1337) (0.0070) (0.1224) (0.7083) (0.5443) (0.8807) (0.0062)  
 0.0106 -0.0178 -0.0163a 0.0373 0.0031 -0.0031  0.0199 a 0.55 
 (0.7888) (0.1219) (0.0061) (0.1089) (0.7269) (0.5483)  (0.0053)  
 0.0025 -0.0181 -0.0161a 0.0400 c  -0.0026  0.0215 a 0.56 
 (0.9364) (0.1089) (0.0057) (0.0649)  (0.5964)  (0.0001)  
 0.0016 -0.0181 -0.0161a 0.0400 c  -0.0026 0.0036 0.0215 a 0.55 
 (0.9755) (0.1159) (0.0066) (0.0695)  (0.6021) (0.9827) (0.0003)  
 -0.0015 -0.0189 c -0.0165 a 0.0374 c    0.0206 a 0.57 
 (0.9621) (0.0889) (0.0039) (0.0720)    (0.0000)  
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Table 7: Indirect impact of country-specific variables on leverage 
This table presents the WLS regression results of coefficients of firm-specific variables ( kjβˆ  estimated from Equation 1 and reported in Table 4) against country-
specific variables, estimated from Equation (4): 
kjjjjjjjkj eGDPCAPITALRSHAREHOLDEKSTDMKTSTOCBONDCREDITORSTDENFOR ++++++++= 76543210ˆ λλλλλλλλβ in which k denotes the coefficients of firm-
specific factors and j denotes a country. All country-specific variables are defined in Table 2. The weights are inverse standard errors of the corresponding 
country dummy coefficients estimated in Equation (2). The significant coefficients are printed in bold with p-values in parentheses. The superscripts a, b, and c 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The number of observations is 37, which are the countries that have all country-
specific variables available. Adj-R2 is the value of adjusted-R2 for the regression. 
 
Explanatory variables Dependent 
variable Intercept STDENFOR CREDITOR BOND STDMKTSTOCK SHAREHODLER CAPITAL GDP 
Adj-R2 
TANG 0.1990 c -0.0042 -0.0091 0.0525 -0.0465 b 0.0118 0.0396 -0.0081 0.13 
 (0.0995) (0.8739) (0.5138) (0.2937) (0.0383) (0.4082) (0.9213) (0.5660)  
 0.2068 b -0.0044 -0.0089 0.0531 -0.0473 b 0.0118  -0.0081 0.16 
 (0.0217) (0.8659) (0.5109) (0.2765) (0.0242) (0.3974)  (0.5609)  
 0.2125 a  -0.0090 0.0490 -0.0466 b 0.0112  -0.0087 0.19 
 (0.0100)  (0.4947) (0.2387) (0.0215) (0.3973)  (0.5153)  
 0.1857 a  -0.0068 0.0596 -0.0532 a 0.0092   0.20 
 (0.0077)  (0.5909) (0.1179) (0.0026) (0.4701)    
RISK 0.0513 -0.0370 0.0229 0.0389 -0.0460 -0.0018 -1.0630 b 0.0063 0.12 
 (0.6950) (0.2490) (0.1301) (0.5183) (0.1442) (0.9165) (0.0209) (0.7539)  
 0.0463 -0.0374 0.0227 0.0392 -0.0476  -1.0608 b 0.0058 0.14 
 (0.6988) (0.2315) (0.1243) (0.5076) (0.0773)  (0.0189) (0.7616)  
 0.0634 -0.0349 0.0209 0.0308 -0.0434 c  -1.0246 b  0.17 
 (0.5415) (0.2392) (0.1151) (0.5492) (0.0553)  (0.0167)   
 0.0908 -0.0282 0.0172  -0.0374 c  -1.0202 b  0.19 
 (0.3277) (0.2976) (0.1354)  (0.0602)  (0.0159)   
SIZE -0.0031 -0.0040 0.0011 -0.0029 0.0002 0.0024 b 0.0305 0.0001 0.17 
 (0.7690) (0.1027) (0.3581) (0.5183) (0.9217) (0.0346) (0.4086) (0.9312)  
 -0.0026 -0.0040 c 0.0010 -0.0030 0.0003 0.0024 b 0.0303  0.19 
 (0.7650) (0.0941) (0.3382) (0.4287) (0.8618) (0.0308) (0.4028)   
 -0.0023 -0.0040 c 0.0011 -0.0029  0.0025 b 0.0274  0.22 
 (0.7841) (0.0861) (0.3285) (0.4314)  (0.0106) (0.3856)   
 -0.0044 -0.0049 b 0.0014   0.0024 b 0.0244  0.23 
 (0.5806) (0.0192) (0.1462)   (0.0120) (0.4321)   
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Table 7 (continued): Indirect impact of country-specific variables on leverage 
 
Explanatory variables Dependent 
variable Intercept STDENFOR CREDITOR BOND STDMKTSTOCK SHAREHODLER CAPITAL GDP 
Adj-R2 
GROWTH 0.0056 -0.0010 0.0000 -0.0034 -0.0014 -0.0005 0.0071 -0.0024 b 0.58 
 (0.5748) (0.5203) (0.9635) (0.4128) (0.4561) (0.4003) (0.8657) (0.0442)  
 0.0058 -0.0010  -0.0034 -0.0014 -0.0005 0.0069 -0.0024 b 0.60 
 (0.5121) (0.3418)  (0.3595) (0.4382) (0.3789) (0.8663) (0.0395)  
 0.0070 -0.0010  -0.0033 -0.0016 -0.0005  -0.0024 b 0.61 
 (0.1453) (0.3250)  (0.3572) (0.2893) (0.2781)  (0.0296)  
PROFIT 0.3167 c 0.1066 a 0.0052 -0.0039 0.0304 -0.0503 a -1.8531 a 0.0034 0.44 
 (0.0503) (0.0063) (0.7688) (0.9521) (0.3230) (0.0054) (0.0019) (0.8612)  
 0.3119 b 0.1056 a 0.0057  0.0295 -0.0502 a -1.8562 a 0.0039 0.46 
 (0.0242) (0.0021) (0.6918)  (0.2672) (0.0046) (0.0015) (0.8176)  
 0.3187 b 0.1062 a 0.0053  0.0309 -0.0495 a -1.8501 a  0.48 
 (0.0169) (0.0016) (0.7077)  (0.2264) (0.0039) (0.0013)   
 0.3271 b 0.1043 a   0.0291 -0.0496 a -1.8309 a  0.49 
 (0.0118) (0.0014)   (0.2389) (0.0034) (0.0012)   
LIQUID 0.0079 b 0.0014 a -0.0001 -0.0052 a -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0257 b 0.0004 0.53 
 (0.0414) (0.0048) (0.7183) (0.0002) (0.5620) (0.3601) (0.0195) (0.4973)  
 0.0069 a 0.0013 a  -0.0050 a -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0249 b 0.0005 0.55 
 (0.0090) (0.0005)  (0.0000) (0.3568) (0.3815) (0.0186) (0.1635)  
 0.0062 b 0.0011 a  -0.0047 a -0.0007  -0.0255 b 0.0005 0.55 
 (0.0124) (0.0005)  (0.0000) (0.1580)  (0.0153) (0.1894)  
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